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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 7, Number 4, Summer 1969

Constitutional Supremacy: An Early Advocate

of Judicial Review
Leonard B. Rosenbergf
It has often been said that judicial review is a necessary ingredient
in a federated system, for supremacy must reside somewhere; and
that in the American system, with its additional tripartite structure,
it is an absolute necessity. Even critics of judicial review generally
agree that the power of the Supreme Court over acts of state legislatures and state courts, as contradistinguished from its power over
congressional legislation and presidential activities, is essential to the
American political system and, in addition, is a constitutional directive (Article VI-the "supremacy clause").
However, although the doctrine of judicial review has been the
successful solution to Madison's question of how to oblige the government to control itself, it was neither immediately asserted nor immediately accepted. During the first decade of its history the Supreme
Court and the federal judiciary, though of relatively minor importance, were never far from the center of political strife. But it was
during this period that the -fundamental structure of the American
judicial system was established and the federal judiciary-especially
the circuit courts-began to assert-perhaps self-consciously-the idea
of judicial authority and national supremacy. Through numerous
court decisions and grand jury charges the people became increasingly aware of the new government and its powers. In short, the
federal courts were beginning the long and endless task of refining
and particularizing the generalities of the Constitution.
t

Professor of Political Science, Paterson State College.
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The first ten years under the Constitution deserve better of historians. Although the federal judiciary made the error of using the
courts too often as a political instrument to enforce its particular
view of governmental powers, judicial statesmanship did not originate with John Marshall. The men who composed the early federal
judiciary were aware of their potential powers and were unafraid to
use them to protect and enhance that authority which they considered to be within the Constitution's meaning. This paper is concerned with the work of one of these men: William Paterson of
New Jersey. Paterson's political and juridical ideas are studied as
an illustration of how Marshall's constitutional interpretations were
foreshadowed in important respects by some of his predecessors.
Although William Paterson played a significant and respected role
in the events which brought the nation into being and which early
gave shape to its political and judicial institutions, he remains little
more than a footnote in the biography of the Constitution and the
early history of the Supreme Court. It is an unfortunate neglect, for
he made valuable contributions to the basic American concepts of
federalism and constitutional supremacy. As New Jersey AttorneyGeneral during the revolutionary war, constitution-maker at the
Philadelphia Convention, Senator, Governor, federal jurist and private citizen, his ideas had considerable circulation and influence.
A Whig in eighteenth century terms, Paterson's views were typical
of those maintained by men of property and position. He believed
in and accepted as working principles the validity of the social compact, the right of revolution, and the sovereignty of the people.
But the war against British despotism was not intended to transform the natural order of things-that is, the rule of persons of
learning, integrity, and stature. Once the concepts of popular sovereignty and limited government had been won with independence,
his efforts, along with those of Adams, Hamilton, and Marshall, were
concentrated on establishing and then sustaining a government which
would at the same time secure the rights of man and restrain the
forces of partisanship and irresponsible democracy. His advocacy of
constitutional supremacy and his assertion of judicial review were
not meant as a dilution of the ideals of the revolution but, rather,
as a guarantee that they would be enjoyed within the prescribed
confines of law, order, and peaceful progress-what he called "rational liberty."
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However devoted Paterson was to the idea of state sovereignty
at the Federal Convention-as exemplified by his introduction of the
small states' or New Jersey Plan, which envisioned a confederation
of equal states-there is ample proof that with the ratification of
the Constitution he became, in George Bancroft's words, "for the
rest of his life a federalist of federalists."' As a United States Senator
and as a Supreme Court Justice his work evinced a dedication to
the generally accepted tenets of his party and class: the protection
of property rights and vested interests, the supremacy of the national
government, and the independence and prestige of federal judicial
power.
Although Paterson and his Federalist contemporaries failed to recognize that the government they had done so much to bring into
being was to be essentially popular in nature, and so suffered the
fate of other anachronistic parties, they played an indispensable role
in the Constitution's first decade. No one doubted in 1800 as they
had in 1789 that the Constitution and the Union would endure.
The foundations for a durable and pliable nation had been laid,
making it ready for the democratization that was bound to come.
Perhaps they served, as Henry Adams said, as the "half-way house
between the European past and the American future." While they
adopted policies that offered power and benefit to special classes,
conducted government with a decided fear of majorities and legislatures, and in the Whisky Rebellion and Sedition Act trials acted
with an unfortunate partisanship that gave rise to a deserved opposition, they, nevertheless, built and governed upon the rock of law
and orderly change. If Paterson was, as Fred Rodell said, among
2
the most politically minded and motivated of the Federalist judges,
it was not so much to advance the fortunes of a particular party as
it was to protect those principles for which he and the party stood.
Although the framers of the Constitution devised a number of
ways to circumscribe the abuses of power,3 it has been judicial re1. HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (New York:
Appleton, 1882), II, 88. [Editor's note: Although, due to the age of the non-legal works
cited, these footnotes are not consistent with A Uniform System of Citation, this style
should be helpful to the researcher.]
2. NINE MEN (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 67.
3. Interestingly, none of these limitations (due process, judicial review, federalism,
separation of powers, the system of checks and balances) was originally spelled out; all
were more or less either deducible from the general provisions of the Constitution or
implicit in its structure and organization. At the Federal Convention the two most
persistent proposals to resolve the problem of national-state friction were that the
Executive and Supreme Court justices be joined in a council of revision with veto power
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view that has proven the most successful American solution to
Madison's question of how to oblige the government to control
itself. It was originally put forth as a doctrine by Paterson and the
early Federalist-minded courts not only for its own sake-as a legal
principle divorced from any contemporary context-but as a useful
tool to promote the entire Federalist program, which, of course, was
identified with the good of the nation, and to thwart the designs of
those opposed to that program. It should be remembered, however,
that other equally sincere friends of liberty and country, fearing judicial despotism as much as the Federalists feared legislative tyranny,
reached rather different views of judicial review. Jefferson, for example, while not denying the authority of the Supreme Court to
determine the constitutionality of legislation in cases actually before
it, nevertheless strenuously rejected the idea that such judicial decisions were binding on the other departments of government. In 1804
he wrote the following:
Nothing in the Constitution has given the judges a right to decide
for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them.
Both magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action
assigned to them.... But the opinion which gives to the judges
the right to decide what laws are Constitutional and what not,
not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the
legislature and Executive also
in their spheres, would make the
4
Judiciary a despotic branch.
William Paterson began his service to the doctrine of judicial review
with his introduction of the supremacy provision of the New Jersey
Plan at the Federal Convention. Significantly, in not a single state at
the time was the doctrine of judicial control of legislative acts an
established institution; everywhere the Blackstonian concept of legislative sovereignty was still dominant.5 The Virginia Plan, for example,
over oppressive or unconstitutional legislation (this had been part of the Virginia Plan)
and that Congress possess a "veto" over state statutes. See MAX FAREAND (ed.), THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19111937), passim.
4. Letter to Mrs. Abigail Adams, September 11, 1804, in A. A. Lipscomb (ed.), THE
WRITINCS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903-1904), II, 50-51. Jefferson felt that the people were best able to resolve conflicts
of constitutional interpretation by their election of specific candidates. See G. CHINARD,
THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM, 2d ed. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1957), p. 387.
5. W. C. WEBSTER, A Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American
Revolution, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, IX (1897),
398-400. Edward S. Corwin points out, however, that between 1776 and 1787 the ideas
of legislative limitation, "higher law," and the finality of judicial construction of the
law were rapidly developing in the United States; The Progress of Constitutional Theory
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proposed instead congressional control over state legislation and a
national council of revision over congressional statutes. It is thus to
Paterson that credit must go for formally introducing the premise
upon which American judicial review (of at least state legislation)
rests: that the Constitution is supreme law and that laws made in pursuance of the Constitution and treaties made under the authority of
the United States partake of that supremacy. From this fundamental
postulate and the concomitant fact that courts administer law, the
early federal judiciary-some of whom, like Paterson, Ellsworth, and
Wilson, had been members of the Philadelphia Convention-derived,
or at least asserted, their rationale for judicial review. What they did
was simply to carry the principle and philosophy of applying the Constitution as law to its logical conclusion: that there exists an accepted
criterion or standard-the national constitution in this case-by which
legislative acts may be judged, and that courts are uniquely competent
and empowered to determine the validity of such acts. "For the first
time in history," Andrew C. McLaughlin commented, "courts [were]
called upon by the simple processes of administering justice . . . to

uphold the structure of the body politic and the principles of the
Constitution." 6
However, in introducing to the Convention the idea of the supremacy of the Constitution, Paterson did not stand alone. There
seems little doubt that Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, King, Gerry, Mason, and Luther Martin among others thought
the judicial power would pass on the validity of legislative enactments
of Congress and state legislatures, whether or not such authority was
specifically granted in the Constitution. James Wilson, for example,
in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787 asserted that:
if a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by
[the Constitution] in Congress, the Judges, as a consequence of
between the Declarationof Independence and the Meeting of the PhiladelphiaConvention,
AMERICAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW,

XXX (1925),

536. Incidentally,

in

this essay Corwin's

definition of judicial review is used: "the power of courts to pass upon the constitutionality
of legislative acts which fall within their normal jurisdiction to enforce and the power
to refuse to enforce such as they find to be unconstitutional and hence void;" Judicial
Review, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (New York: Macmillan, 1937), VIII, 457
[Hereinafter cited as Judicial Review].
6. THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1905), p. 247. However, until the Marbury v. Madison decision in 1803 there were only
hints and indecisive attempts at national judicial review (the authority of the federal
courts to pass on the validity of acts of Congress). What the early federal courts did
achieve was the application of federal judicial review-the right of the courts to control
state legislation that conflicted with the Constitution, treaties, or national laws. See E. S.
Corwin, JudicialReview, supra.
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their independence, and the particular powers of government
being defined, will declare such law to be null and void. For the
power of the constitution predominates. Anything, therefore, that
shall7 be enacted by Congress thereto, will not have the force of
law.

Paterson's service to the "nationalist" cause of judicial review continued in the first Senate, where, together with his friend and later
court associate, Oliver Ellsworth, he helped give shape and scope to
the new federal judicature in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The twentyfifth article of that act authorized writs of error to the Supreme Court
from judgments of state courts, which by implication meant that the
Court was empowered to pass on the constitutionality of state statutes.
(Of the Senate committee that framed the Act, half had served in the
Philadelphia Convention, including its two chief architects, Ellsworth
and Paterson, and presumably knew the Convention's views concerning the judiciary.) The Supreme Court was entitled by that article
upon a writ of error to re-examine and reverse or affirm
where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of,
or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State,
on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour
of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of,
or commission held under the United States, and the decision is
against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or
claimed by either party, under such clause of said Constitution,
treaty, statute or commission ....8
7.

Quoted in J. B. McMASTER

and

F. D.

STONE, PENNSYLVANIA

AND THE

FEDERAL

1787-1788 (Philadelphis: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1888), p. 354.
Judicial review was a principle that Wilson was to implement five years later as a member
of the Supreme Court in what may have been the Court's first enunciation of the doctrine,
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas 409 (1792). See MAX FARRAND, The First Hayburn Case, 1792,
CONSTITUTION,

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, XIII (1908), 281-285.

A number of scholars believe that the principle of judicial review was widely accepted
at the time of the Federal Convention. See, for example, MAX FARRAND, THE FATHERS OF
THE CONS'ITUTION (New York: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 132; E. S. CoRwIN, The
Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, XXX
(1936), 1078; CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (Boston: Little, Brown,

1937), pp. 337, 337n. J. H. Ralston, however, believes that the Convention, which had every
opportunity to express its advocacy of judicial review in the completed document had it
so desired, rejected the doctrine in favor of an executive veto, thus proving that the Convention never intended the courts to exercise such power; JudicialControl over Legislatures
as to Constitutional Questions, THE AMERICAN LAW REVIEW, LIV (1920), 8-10.

8. 1 U.S. STATUTES 85-86 (September 24, 1789). The Act was chiefly aimed at assuring
that a state would fulfill its obligations by providing that a state court decision could be

520

Constitutional Supremacy
But it was with his elevation to the nation's highest tribunal in
1793 that William Paterson was able to implement whatever possibilities may have been implied in his earlier work. Although other judges
on the federal bench had already declared a few state laws invalid on
the grounds of constitutional incompatibility, it was in Paterson's
opinion in Van Horne v. Dorrance that the concept of judicial review
of state legislation by a federal court received its first clear, well-defined, and unqualified expression. 9 Rejecting counsel's argument that
a Pennsylvania statute which repealed an earlier confirming title of
certain claimants to lands was an ex post facto law, he, nevertheless,
accepted the assertion that the act violated the constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts. 10 The decision,
which aroused intense and partisan controversy at the time, while
popular with Pennsylvania land speculators, was opposed by both Republicans, who were against the doctrine of judicial review, and Connecticut Federalists, who had settled on Pennsylvania lands and now
expected to suffer as a result of the ruling. Indeed, it was then generally believed that Paterson lost the opportunity for the chief justiceship because of the opposition of certain influential Federalists over
his ruling in the case." A year later in Ware v. Hylton he continued
to uphold the idea that the judicial power of the United States is empowered to protect federal legislation against hostile state action. A
treaty, he declared along with Justices Chase, Cushing, and Wilson,
brought to the federal Supreme Court if there was a failure to give full effect to
constitutional provisions, federal laws, or treaties. The twenty-fifth section of the Act also
implied judicial review of congressional statutes by the Supreme Court, for the Court
could agree as well as disagree with a state court's decision concerning the validity of a
federal law, which, in effect, would uphold or reject a congressional act on the grounds of
constitutionality. See A. C. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1935), pp. 235-237. For a view that doubts that the
Judiciary Act granted broad powers of judicial review, see Ralston, Judicial Control over
Legislatures as to Constitutional Questions, p. 10.

Charles Warren, however, thought that, although the Act is often cited as an expression of early support for judicial review, the fact is that the final form the Act assumed was
a compromise beween the extreme Federalist desire to have the federal courts exercise to
the fullest extent the judicial powers granted or implied by the Constitution and the
fear of those who saw national authority as a threat to states' rights and wanted all
litigation to commence in state courts; New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, XXXVII (1923), 53, 57, 131. Andrew C. McLaughlin,

giving an opposite view, believed that the Judiciary Act's enactment by a Congress
composed of so many members who had also served in the Federal Convention suggested
that the judicial review that the Act implied was fully within the intentions of the
framers of the Constitution; A CONSTITTrrIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, pp. 236-237.

9.

2 Dallas 304, 308 (1795).

10. Id. at 310.
11. AURORA, September 20 and 28, 1803, in Charles Warren, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (Boston, Little, Brown, 1926), I, 69n. Historians, however, have

generally assigned other reasons for Adams' choice of Marshall as Chief Justice.
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was in effect superior to any and all state laws that were inconsistent
with its provisions or implementation.' 2 An interesting side note to
this litigation was the position taken by John Marshall, then a lawyer
arguing a case before the Supreme Court. In an argument almost
diametrically opposite the one that he maintained seven years later in
the history-making Marbury v. Madison opinion, 13 Marshall remarked
that
the legislative authority of any country can only be restrained
by its own municipal constitution. This is a principle that
springs from the very nature of society; and the judicial authority
can have no right to question the validity of a law unless such a
jurisdiction is expressly given by the constitution ....

14

Thus, at a time when Paterson and other members of the federal bench
were consistently assuming the power of judicial review, which later
became the essence of the Marbury decision, John Marshall argued that
the power had to be "expressly given by the constitution."
There is even the probability that Paterson participated in the
decision that may have first invalidated an act of Congress, nine years
before the famous Marshall opinion. There was no official reporter at
the time and so evidence must rest upon a note Chief Justice Taney
inserted into the record of U.S. v. Ferreira,decided in 1851.15 Taney
cited the 1794 case of U.S. v. Yale Todd, in which Chief Justice Jay
and Justices Blair, Cushing, Paterson, and Wilson unanimously held
that the act of 1792, which directed Supreme Court justices to act as
commissioners in pension cases in their circuit court duties, assigned
nonjudicial functions to judges and, being contrary to the Constitution, was therefore void. However, if this case remains historically uncertain, there is no doubt about the famous "Carriage Tax Case" of
1796.16 Although Paterson and his colleagues upheld federal legislation
12. 3 Dallas 199, 249 (1796).
13. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
14. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas 199, 211 (1796).
15. 13 Howard 52. J. H. Ralston casts doubt on the authenticity or influence of the
Yale Todd decision; Judicial Control, pp. 10-12. An earlier claim to this honor is sometimes made for Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas 409 (1792), in which a federal circuit court
apparently rejected an attempt by Congress to impose nonjudicial duties on the federal
courts. However, before the Supreme Court could render a final decision the Congress by
the act of February 28, 1793, altered the law. See Farrand, The First Hayburn Case, 1792,
pp. 281-285; E. S. CORWIN et al., UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, annotated (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 564-565. Chancellor Kent accepted the
Hayburn decision as the first such instance of judicial review; COMMENTARIES ON
AMERcCAN LAW, 14th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1896), I, 450.
16. Hylton v. U.S. 3 Dallas 171.
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in this instance, and hence, however prophetic and suggestive it may
seem in retrospect, caused no particular outburst or criticism, the
Supreme Court very definitely proclaimed its right to exercise the
function of judging the constitutionality of congressional acts. Here,
Fred Rodell remarked, "the Supreme Court, for the first time as a
Supreme Court, undertook without so much as blinking to pass on
the validity of an act of Congress.' 7 The question of the constitutionality of congressional action also came up in Hollingsworth v.
Virginia; here a unanimous Court (Paterson concurring) sustained
the power of Congress to initiate and accept as enacted an amendment
8
to the Constitution without presidential approval or involvement.1
Paterson hinted at or openly expressed this idea of judicial control
of legislation on a number of other occasions, although admittedly not
until the Marbury case in 1803 (in which Paterson joined in Marshall's
decision) did the nation's highest court actually declare for the first
time a federal law unconstitutional. Although he indirectly sustained
the validity of the Sedition Act in the 1798 controversial trial for sedition of Congressman Matthew Lyon, Paterson suggested that there
were tribunals or courts competent to judge the validity of congressional statutes.' 9 In one of the several sedition cases that came before
him, he drew attention, in enforcing the provisions of the Sedition
Act, to the "happy circumstance, that when any act ... occurs, we have
a competent authority to pass upon it, and to decide, whether it be
constitutional or not. This authority is vested in the courts of the
'20
United States."
What, in effect, Paterson was saying in these cases was, first, that the
Constitution is law, enforceable by courts; second, that the Constitu17.

NINE MEN (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 67.

18. 3 Dallas 378 (1798).
19. Paterson held that until the law (Sedition Act) was declared null and void by a
tribunal competent for the purpose, its validity could not be disputed. "Great would be
the abuses," he said, "were the constitutionality of every statute to be submitted to a jury.
. . . ;" FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS

OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS (Philadelphis: Carey and Hart, 1849), p. 336.
20. [Opinion from the Bench], c. 1798, AMl1457, Princeton University Library (P.U.L.);
Bancroft Transcripts, p. 543, New York Public Library (N.Y.P.L.).
Incidentally, Paterson felt that the popular basis of the government and Constitution of
the nation made public support a primary duty of citizenship. It was for this reason that
he so vigorously prosecuted those guilty of treason and sedition. The United States, he said,
was a government with freedom as its basis and happiness as its object. "Crimes perpetrated against such a government ought to be considered as pointed against the wellbeing, the political existence, and ... the majesty of the people themselves." Sedition and
treason, then, were not merely crimes against authority, but, in Paterson's eyes, against
the very sovereignty of the people themselves and the instruments of government that
they had created; Charge to a Federal grand jury, c. 1798, Rutgers University Library
(R.U.L.).
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tion is supreme; and third, that judicial interpretations of the law
are binding and final, at least for the cases before the courts. But here
as in so many other areas he was more representative than original.
Even before the Federal Convention, the principle of judicial review
had been enunciated by state courts concerning state statutes in six or
seven well-established cases. 21 James M. Varnum, for example, in the
1786 Rhode Island case of Trevett v. Weeden, speaking as counsel for
the defendant, was quite definite that "the judiciary have the sole
power of judging the law . . .and can not admit any act of the legislatures as law against the Constitution. ' 22 The case that is generally
accepted as the earliest instance of state judicial review, and the one
that probably exercised the most direct influence on Paterson, was the
1780 New Jersey case of Holmes v. Walton. Here the state's highest
tribunal declared an act which established a jury of six men in violation
of the state constitution and therefore invalid. Three of New Jersey's
delegates to the Federal Convention were high state officials at the
time of the decision and directly or indirectly involved in the litigation.23 None of Paterson's own expositions on judicial review-nor,
for that matter, Hamilton's classic assertion of the principle in The
Federalist, No. 78-added anything essential to the early pronouncement by James Iredell of the North Carolina Supreme Court (and
later of the United States Supreme Court) when in 1787 he voided a
statute that confirmed title to lands confiscated from Tories during
the Revolution:
the duty of [the judiciary] I conceive in all cases is to decide according to the laws of the State. It will not be denied . .. that
the constitution is a law of the State ...with this difference only,
that it is the fundamental law, and unalterable by the legislature,
which derives all its power from it. . . . The judges, therefore,
must take care at their peril, that every act of Assembly they pre21. Ralston, Judicial Control, pp. 6-7.
22. Quoted in E. S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory between the
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, AMERICAN
HISTORICAL REVIEW, XXX (1925), 526.
23. William Livingston was governor and Chancellor; David Brearley was the Chief
Justice who delivered the opinion; and William Paterson was the state Attorney-General.
See Austin Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, AMERICAN HISTORICAL
REVIEW, IV (1899), 456-469. Against Scott's strong and generally accepted thesis on behalf
of the Holmes case as a precedent stands Louis Boudin's vigorous rejection of the Contention; GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (New York: William Godwin, 1932), I, 536ff. C. C.
Haines, on the other hand, accepts the case as the first instance of judicial review, but
holds that Scott overemphasized its importance and influence in the Convention's work;
THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, 2d ed., (New York: Russell and
Russell, 1958), pp. 93-94. E. S. Corwin also recognized the validity of Scott's. averment;
The Progress of Constitutional Theory, p. 521.
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sume to enforce is warranted by the2 4constitution, since if it is
not, they act without lawful authority.

From the ratification of the Constitution to the Marbury decision in
1803 the doctrine of judicial review, despite occasional denials or
criticism, gained even more momentum. At least fourteen more state
court opinions were rendered that either pronounced statutes unconstitutional or expressed views highly favorable to the doctrine. 25 No
words, for example, could have been plainer than those of Judge Spencer Roane of the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1793, two years before
Paterson's own opinion in the Van Home case: "The judiciary may
and ought to adjudge a law unconstitutional and void, if it be plainly
repugnant to the letter of the Constitution, or the fundamental principles thereof. ' 26 The young federal judiciary, moreover, was not far
behind state courts in asserting its power over legislative acts. At least
a half-dozen state laws were invalidated by federal courts on the
grounds of unconstitutionality during this period; Paterson participated in several of these cases. 27 For example, three years before the
Van Home opinion the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island
(Chief Justice Jay presiding) declared a Rhode Island statute un28
constitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contract.
Innumerable contemporary comments and illustrations on the acceptance of the doctrine of judicial review may be cited, but they all
add up to the fact that the idea of judicial control over the acts of
24. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin (N.C.) 5, 42. This decision was strongly opposed by
the governor of North Carolina, John Alexander Martin, later a delegate to the Federal
Convention (but not a signer of the Constitution); Ralston, Judicial Control, p. 7. Eleven
years later in Minge v. Gilmour, Iredell as a member of the federal judiciary again
dearly affirmed judicial authority over legislative acts: "If an act be unconstitutional, it is
void .... (An unconstitutional act) the courts must certainly declare to be void, because
(it was) passed without any authority whatever. The constitution, by saying that the
legislature shall have authority in certain cases, but shall not have in others, as plainly
declares everything valid done in pursuance of the first provision, as everything void that
is done in contradiction of the last . . .;" 17 Federal Cases 44ff (No. 9,631) (1798).
25. Ralston, Judicial Control, pp. 208-209. Saul K. Padover puts the number of state
court decisions invalidating statutes as unconstitutional at ten for the period of 1789-1803;
THE GENIUS OF AMERICA (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 129. Andrew C. McLaughlin,
however, gives thirteen examples of such cases; A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (New York: Appleton-Century, 1935), pp. 312n-313n. Court records being what
they were and judges often handing down decisions without specifying reasons for them
make exact verification difficult.
26. Kamper v. Hawkins, I Virginia Cases, 36, 40.
27. Padover, loc. cit.
28. Champion and Dickason v. Casey (1792), reported in WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, I, 67-68. Though the case was widely reported throughout the state, the decision seemingly aroused no opposition-and this was in a state
which six years earlier had sought the impeachment of its own judges for daring to hold
a law' invalid.
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state legislatures-by either state or federal courts-predated Paterson's Van Horne ruling and had gained such recognition by 1803 that
those instances where it was exercised apparently met little opposition
and few claims that the courts had acted without constitutional
authority. 29 Except for the criticism engendered by the Van Home v.
Dorrance decision, these early assertions of judicial power seemingly
aroused little sentiment one way or the other.30 Indeed, Charles Grove
Haines noted that "the opinion that courts could invalidate legislative
acts was gaining such popularity that it was to be expected that the
national judiciary under Federalist control would at the earliest favorable opportunity, assume the special guardianship of the fundamental law."31 Thus while Paterson paved the way for Marshall and
others, he also followed in the footsteps of those who preceded him and
along the path of contemporary legal theory and practice. His work,
rather than isolated or innovational, was part of an evolutionary movement in the development of American constitutional law.
Though not quite as political-minded or obstreperous as his brother
justice, Samuel Chase, who vigorously opposed any diminution of judicial prerogatives8 2 Paterson was every bit as insistent on the independence and authority of the judicial arm of the federal government-so
much so that his son and others believed that had Chase's impeachment
trial ended in a verdict of guilty Justice Paterson would have been the
next victim of the now dominant Republicans. 33 It was an instance,
not only on proper constitutional construction, but also in the cause of
vested rights-not at all surprising if it is recalled that Paterson had
long believed that peace of mind and the security of society were based
on the protection of property and contractual obligations and the
29.
30.
31.

WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY,

69.

Id.

THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, p. 183. E. S. Corwin credits the
general acceptance of judicial review by the middle of the nineteenth century not only to
the Marbury v. Madison precedent but also to the espousal of the principle in some
of the earlier federal court decisions by Paterson and his Federalist colleagues. See CORWIN
et al, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 628.

32. Chase strongly protested the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1802 which reinstated
the detested circuit court duty for Supreme Court justices. He felt that the judges should
refuse such assignments on the grounds of their unconstitutionality. Letters from John
Marshall to William Paterson, May 3, 1802, and from Samuel Chase to Paterson, April 24,
1802 (copy of letter sent to John Marshall), Bancroft Transcripts, pp. 651-657, 663-697,
N.Y.P.L.

33. Letters from William Bell Paterson to William Paterson, March 26, 1805, Ac6187A,
Library of Congress, and from John Quincy Adams to John Adams, March 8, 1805, in
W. C. Ford (ed.), THE WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (New York: Macmillan, 1913-1917),
III, 106-114.
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observance of the law. 34 He early understood that judicial power involved more than a simple declaration of what the law is. "The Powers
of the Supreme Court are great-they are to check the Excess of
Legislation," he observed in the first Senate during the debates on
the establishment of the federal judiciary. 5 Where personal concepts
of property rights or national sovereignty were jeopardized by legislative enactments, he often informed legislatures as to their powers and,
especially their limitations.3 6 An example of judicial behavior motivated by political or personal beliefs may be gathered from the
newspaper account of his charge to the grand jury at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, May 24, 1800:
(The judge) delivered a most elegant and appropriate charge. The
Law was laid down in a masterly manner. Politics were set in their
true light by holding up the Jacobins as the disorganizers of our
happy country, and the only instruments of introducing discontent and dissatisfaction among the well meaning part of the community. Religion and Morality were ...

inculcated and enforced

as being necessary to good government, good order, and good
37
laws; for 'when the righteous are in authority,the people rejoice.'
But significantly, where programs that he favored were being implemented, such as the Hamilton fiscal policy with its broad powers of
taxation, or the suppression of sedition and libel against the government, Paterson invariably was on the side of expanded or implied
38

legislative authority.

Paterson and his Federalist colleagues, however, also understood that
a certain measure of judicial restraint was a necessary ingredient of
contemporary political life. Whether willingly or not, from the very
establishment of the national judiciary federal judges found themselves
34. See, for example, [Notes for a Legislative Hearing], November 2, 1784, Pyne-Henry,
AM1362, P.U.L.

35.

Notes for a Senate speech, probably delivered in July, 1789, Rutgers University

Library (R.U.L.); Bancroft Transcripts, p. 495, N.Y.P.L.

36. See, for example, Van Horne v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas 304, 312 (1795); Penhallow v.
Doane, 3 Dallas 54, (1795); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas 199, 249 (1796).
37. UNITED STATES ORACLE OF THE DAY, quoted in W. H. Hackett, The Circuit Court
for the New Hampshire District One Hundred Years Ago, THE GREEN BAG, 11 (1890), 264.

Interestingly, Paterson refused to give the ORACLE a copy of his charge to the jury. The
refusal was probably due to his desire to use the charge again, a common practice of his.
38. See, for example, Hylton v. U.S., 3 Dallas 171, 176 (1796); Sedition trials, c. 1798;
trial of Matthew Lyon, 1798, in WHARTON, STATE TRIALS, pp. 333ff. However, a consistency
may be seen here. Paterson's judicial restrictions were generally aimed at state legislatures,
which often were debtor-conscious, whereas the espousal of expanded legislative authority
was usually limited to Congress, which until the election of 1800 was safely Federalist.
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knee-deep in politics and partisanship. Yet, though partisan and dedicated to their particular concept of liberty and law, they were far from
being runaway or willful men. Even the not always restrained Chase,
in refusing to touch the question of constitutionality in Calder v. Bull,
remarked that if he were ever to exercise the power of rejecting the
validity of an act of Congress, it would have to be in a very clear
case&9-a view fully shared by Paterson in Cooper v. Telfair.40 Although the Supreme Court had not yet developed the "cautionary
considerations" that now govern the operation of judicial power, there
is little doubt that the Court recognized certain bounds to the exercise
of its authority. "It is an obvious and just remark," Paterson observed
in one of the sedition cases, "that we ought not, on slight grounds, to
suppose, that Congress would violate the constitution when they are
under oath to support it. The case should be clear, and liable to no
well-founded doubt, before we undertake to pronounce an act of Congress to be void for want of constitutionality." 41 Considering the frequently strained relations between the Executive and Judicial departments of government, the changing economic structure of the country,
and the developing sectional polarization during the first half century
of the Republic's history, the employment of the power of judicial review over state or federal legislation cannot fairly be said to have been
abusive. In Stuart v. Laird, for example, Paterson, speaking for the
Court, avoided the attempt to secure a decision as to the constitutionality of the repealing act of 1802 (which had reinstated the old
system of circuit duty and eliminated one of the Court's two annual
sessions) and, in effect, gave judicial sanction to a law he could have
42
only detested.
39. 3 Dallas 386, 395 (1798). Both Chase and Iredell here clearly expressed the idea-of
legislative limitation. However, though agreeing that legislatures were limited in power,
they parted company in the use of "natural justice" as a determent to legislative omnipotence. The former held that there were certain vital principles which would overrule
"an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power" even without specific constitutional
authority, whereas the latter felt that if a legislature passed a law within the general
scope of constitutional provisions, "the court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely
because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice"; 3 Dallas
386, 387, 388, 399.
40. 4 Dallas 14, 19 (1800).
41. [Opinion from the Bench], c. 1798, AM11457, P.U.L.; Bancroft Transcripts, p. 543,
N.Y.P.L. For the courts "to pronounce any law void," he declared in Cooper v. Telfair,
"It must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative application;" 4 Dallas 14, 19 (1800).
42. 1 Cranch 299, 308 (1803). Such restraint was probably a wise move on the Court'spart since political power had shifted to the Republicans. See also letters from Paterson
to Justice William Cushing, May 6, 1802, and to Chief Justice John Marshall, June 18,
1802, Bancroft Transcripts, pp. 649, 769, N.Y.P.L. Paterson's private and public opinion
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The federal courts, perhaps wisely for their own position, early developed the practice of presuming legislative acts valid unless they
were clearly proven otherwise. Paterson was well aware that this principle, which he enunciated on several occasions was among the maxims
of law. In the back of an account book he kept for the years 1783-1787,
when he was successfully practicing law, are a number of similar wellestablished maxims:
An act of parliament shall never be construed to be void, if it
can possibly be otherwise; but it shall be expounded in such a
manner that it may as far as possible attain its End.
When a decln. (declaration) will have two Constructions, and
one will make it good and the other bad, the Court, after a Verdict
will take it in the better sense.
Acts of Parliament, in what they are silent, are best expounded
43
according to the use and Reason of the Common Law.
Here is the suggestion that even before the Philadelphia Convention
Paterson was cognizant and probably in favor of the concept of legislative limitation; for, though statutes were to be construed as valid if
at all possible, the implication was clear: there was an external criterion of validity-be it "right reason" or the "higher law" of a constitution-by which they could be judged if necessary.
4
Van Horne v. Dorrance4

Though Paterson's entire judicial career evidenced a strong inclination toward judicial independence and a firm conviction in judicial power, his importance in American constitutional (post-Convention) history rests chiefly on one decision. In most of the other cases
in which he asserted the power of the national judiciary he was either
sustaining existing laws and governmental authority or acting in concert with fellow justices of the Supreme Court. But in the circuit
court ruling of Van Home v. Dorrance, he boldly and independently
proclaimed-in the clearest, if not the first, such case-the essence of
Federalist principles of government, society, and law. Eight years before Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison45 and fifteen years
was that practice and acquiescence under the system of circuit duty had put the question
of its validity to rest.
43. Paterson Account Book, 1783-1787, AM11457, P.U.L.
44. 2 Dallas 304 (1795).
45. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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before the Chief Justice's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck,46 Paterson pronounced ideas on judicial authority and the contract clause of the
Constitution anticipatory of these later judgments. The Van Home
ruling, in which judicial review was made applicable to state laws
specifically and to all legislation in theory, encompasses so much of
Paterson's thoughts and, indeed, that of his class, profession, and party
on such a variety of subjects that much of the opinion-in excerpted
form-has already been applied in other areas of this paper. However,
it is so illustrative of Paterson's entire political philosophy that it
deserves a more complete treatment, both for its historical significance
in the development of the concept of judicial review and as a revealing
study of a representative Federalist mind.
The facts in the case are as follows: during the colonial period a
group of Connecticut farmers settled on land along the Susquehanna
River's North Branch in Pennsylvania, having acquired title in 1754
from the Indians (and from Connecticut) rather than from the proprietors as required by the Pennsylvania laws of 1705 and 1729. The
proprietors' descendents, however, had sold the land in 1771 to some
Philadelphia speculators and Pennsylvania farmers. Frequent warfare
broke out between the two groups. After independence and under
popular pressure, the legislature of Pennsylvania enacted several
"quieting and confirming acts," acknowledging the title of most of the
"squatters." But in 1788 the legislature passed an act suspending the
earlier confirming law and in 1790 repealed it outright. Renewed
violence and bloodshed constantly endangered the peace of the state.
47
The question in the suit involved the conflicting claims.
The real issue behind the litigation, however, was not merely the
rival claims of the parties seeking adjudication but the struggle for
power. It was a contest between the settlers, mostly small farmers, and
a few wealthy land speculators of Philadelphia with paper titles. Although the decision in the case may not have been influenced by external factors, it is interesting to note that among the latter group were
Paterson's friends and former clients and even colleagues on the Supreme Court. The settlers, on the contrary, were men of no particular
prominence, but they were independent and quite ready to defend
their rights, by arms if necessary. The question in the case dragged on
46. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810).
47. For an account of the violence and strife in 1784 in the Wyoming Valley of
Pennsylvania see J. B. MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
(New York: D. Appleton, 1931), 210-216.
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for more than twenty-five years; it continued to hinder the development of Pennsylvania and constantly threatened to disturb the not-toostable peace of the Union. 4 Paterson, in instructing the jury to find in
favor of the plaintiffs, rejected the idea that long and uninterrupted
possession conferred legal title and supported, rather, the claim of
vested rights, contractual obligations, and the protection of private
property (at a time when popularly elected state legislatures were accused of jeopardizing these concepts). In fact, according to Julian P.
Boyd, William Paterson "delivered not so much a charge to a jury as
an address to the American people on the nature of written constitutions and the rightful duties of courts in determining the bounds of
'49
legislative power.
The case of Van Horne v. Dorrance,which aroused considerable expectation, concerned a number of important problems of constitutional
law. Perhaps conscious that judicial history was being made, Paterson
did not believe, or even desire, that his decision would go unchallenged; rather, he hoped that "for the sake of the parties, as well as for
my own sake, [the facts] ought to be put in a train for ultimate adjudication by the supreme court." He expressed pleasure that the opinion
of no one judge need be final or decisive, "but that the same may be
removed before the highest tribunal for revision, where, if erroneous,
it will be rectified." Thus he felt the desirability and propriety of
deciding upon all the material points in the cause, including the question of constitutionality, even though such treatment was not a necessity for the case's determination." ° He advised the jury that frequently
it must decide points of law as well as of fact in order to form correct
judgments; for, when made in a proper manner judicial decisions have
stability and civil rights security. "Hence uniformity and certainty," he
said, returning to a favorite theme, "hence the decisions of tomorrow
will be like the decision of to-day; they will run in the same line, because they are founded on the same principles." 51 After reassuring the
jury of its importance and competence, Paterson then commenced the
presentation of arguments to establish the validity of the plaintiffs'
claims.
Admitting that "legislation is the exercise of sovereign authority,"
48.

J. P. Boyd, William Paterson, Forerunnerof John Marshall, in WILLARD THORP,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 16.
Id. at 17.
2 Dallas 304, 319.
Id., at 307.

THE LIVES OF EIGHTEEN FROM PRINCETON

49.
50.
51.
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he noted that legislative bodies were necessarily vested with important
powers and in some countries were entirely without checks and restraints. He cited England as a land in which the parliament was supreme and absolute and where the constitution-unclear and unwritten as it was-was completely at legislative mercy, with no judicial
recourse to parliamentary infringements. 52 However, the situation in
this country was different; for here each state had its own fundamental
law or constitution in a fixed and written form. And, what is a constitution?, he asked.
It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of
the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws
are established ....

it contains the permanent will of the people,

53
and is the supreme law of the land.

As the supreme law of the land it was paramount to the power of the
legislature and revokable or alterable only by the sovereign will of
54
the people who made it.

But if constitutions were the direct instruments of the popular will,
Paterson asked rhetorically, then what were legislatures?
Creatures of the constitution [he answered]; they owe their existence to the constitution: they derive their powers from the constitution: it is their commission; and therefore, all their acts must
be conformable to it, or else they will be void.
Thus, whereas the Constitution was the work or will of the people
acting in their unlimited, sovereign, and original capacity, "law is the
work or will of the legislature, in their derivative and subordinate
capacity. The one is the work of the creator, and the other of the
creature."5 The Constitution, which fixed limits to and prescribed the
52. Id., at 308. Paterson probably overstated his description of the English situation.
The British constitution, of course, did not exist in fact. There was no legal distinction
between constitutional law and ordinary parliamentary enactments, although certain
customs, judicial pronouncements, and particular laws were often considered as providing
something of a fundamental law for the realm. However, Paterson's use of the term
"British constitution" was correct in the light of contemporary American thought. It will
be remembered that the American Revolution was at least partially justified on the
grounds of violations of the British constitution.
53. Id.
54. Id. How different in sentiment was this belief in the permanence and stability of
constitutions from Jefferson's well-known conviction that the Constitution should provide "for . . . revision at stated periods" so that "laws and institutions [may] go hand
in hand with the progress of the human mind;" letter from Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval,
July 12, 1816, in A. A. Lipscomb (ed.), THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Washington,
D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903-1904), XV, 40-42.
55. 2 Dallas 308. Here Paterson seems to have forgotten that both the Constitution and
the laws are products of representative bodies and that the legislature may very well
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scope of legislative power, "is the sun of the political system, around
which all legislative, executive, and judicial bodies must revolve."
Regardless of the situation in other governments, he continued,
"there can be no doubt that [in this country] every act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is absolutely void."5 6
Paterson next proceeded to illustrate the limitations of legislatures,
using the declaration of rights in the Pennsylvania state constitution
as an example of a political area beyond the reach of the lawmaking
body's power of annulment or revision. 57 Unlike Jefferson, who believed that each generation, being independent, had "a right to
choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive
of its own happiness, ' es Paterson thought that
the constitution of a.state is stable and permanent, not to be
worked upon by the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with
the tide of events... it remains firm and immovable.., as a mountain amidst the strife of storms [party conflicts] . . .9
In terms no less clear and definitive than those of John Marshall
in the Marbury decision eight years later, he went on to describe
the essence of judicial review.
I take it to be a clear position; that if a legislative act oppugns
a constitutional principle, the former must give way, and be rejected on the score of repugnance. I hold it to be a position equally
clear and sound, that, in such case, it will be the duty of the court
to the constitution, and to declare the act null and
to adhere
void.60
And, in phrases that left no doubt as to their meaning, Paterson
asserted the independence and power of the judiciary. The Constitution, he said, as the basis for all law is the rule and commission
for both legislators and judges. "It is an important principle, which
. . . ought never to be lost sight of, that the judiciary in this country
is not a subordinate, but co-ordinate, branch of the government." 6'
What Paterson implied was that the courts were empowered to rebetter represent the current will of the people than a document framed by an elected
convention of the past.
56. Id.
57. Id., at 309.
58. Letter from Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in LIFSCOMB, JEfFEMSON
WRITINGS, XV, 42.
59. 2 Dallas 309.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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view legislative acts, not because they were some kind of super censor
over undesirable laws (although, as already mentioned, he did believe
the Supreme Court was intended to block the excesses of legislatures)
or because they were superior to legislatures, but because as an independent and coordinate body they had a right to an independent
judgment concerning constitutional construction and the scope of
legislative authority. 62 It was a view fully in line with the frequent
emphasis by the federal courts of the period on the status of the
judiciary as an equal department within the government.
The right of the courts to adjudge the statutes of legislatures
having been established-or at least put forth-the next problem Paterson had to face was whether the particular law in question, the
Pennsylvania confirming act, had in fact violated the Constitution.
To prove this point he resorted to the Lockean idea of the social
compact. The right to acquire and possess property, he said, is "one
of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man." Men naturally have a sense of property, which is necessary to fulfill their
natural wants and desires; "its security was one of the objects that
induced them to unite in society." No man would enter a society
unless he could enjoy the fruits of his labor and industry; their preservation, then, was "a primary object of the social compact and, by
the late constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law."
Since it would be "a monster in legislation" to require a person to
surrender or sacrifice his property to the community without just
compensation, the legislature of Pennsylvania, therefore, had no authority to enact a law divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting
63
it in another without remuneration in value.
It is inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice and moral
rectitude; it is incompatible with the comfort, peace and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to the principle of social alliance,
in every free government; and lastly, it is contrary both to the
letter and spirit of the constitution. In short, it is what 6every
one
4
would think unreasonable and unjust in his own case.
Paterson marshalling his great weapons in the cause of judicial authority and vested rights: Coke's "higher law" and rule of reason, the
62.
York:
63.
64.
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ethics of religion, and the logic of property motivation for human
sociality.
Paterson denied that even with compensation the legislature could
transfer property from one group of citizens to another. Some urged,
he said, that it was in the nature of the social contract that the legislature under certain emergencies could exercise this great power. In
this cause the defendant claimed that such a power existed in every
government when state necessity so required; that no government
could exist without this authority; and that it was most safely lodged
with the legislature, which would not exercise it unless compelled
by circumstances to do so. While admitting the strength of the argument, Paterson declared he found it difficult to think of a case or a
necessity that would require the legislature to take property from one
group and give it to another. 65 In words and ideas similar to two
newspaper articles he wrote at about the same time and reminiscent
of one written in 1786 on the inequity of paper money emissions
(on the same grounds of reason and natural law), 66 he reaffirmed the
eighteenth-century concept of government not as guarantor of social
justice but as an "umpire" and a protector of social security:
It is
vested;
should
of it.

immaterial to the state, in which of its citizens the land is
but it is of primary importance, that, when vested, it
be secured, and the proprietor protected in the enjoyment 67
The constitution encircles and renders it a holy thing.

He pointed out that the property involved in the case before the
court concerned landed, not personal property-property not lost because of war, famine, or temporary conditions. It was property expressly protected and secured by the constitution; "it is a right not
ex gratia from the legislature, but ex debito from the constitution."
The fundamental law, being the origin and measure of all legislative authority, said in effect to legislatures, "thus far ye shall go and
no farther. Not a particle of it should be shaken; not a pebble of it
should be removed." Innovation, he warned, was dangerous, for one
encroachment, one precedent, leads to others; "thus radical principles are generally broken in upon, and the constitution eventually
destroyed." 68
65. Id., at 311.
66. Original Ms., 1786, R.U.L.; Bancroft Transcripts, p. 23, N.Y.P.L.; [Political Essays,
Nos. 33, 46], c. 1793-1797, R.U.L.
67. 2 Dallas 311.
68. Id., at 312.
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Where is the security and the inviolability of property, Paterson
inquired, if a legislature can, by statute, dispossess one citizen of his
land, who had acquired it legally, and assign it to another? The
rights of private property were to be regulated and protected not by
laws or tribunals created by immediate exigency, but by those that
are known, general, and established; "their operation and influence
are equal and universal; they press alike on all. Hence security and
safety, tranquility and peace." 69 Here, in a sense, was the developing
concept of due process and the belief that in law, applicable on all
alike, is found the security and peace of society.70 How much safer
and wiser, Paterson declared, to risk a little possible mischief than
to give to the legislature power over property -"a

power that . . . is

7
boundless and omnipresent." '
But, he went on, even admitting the power of the legislature to
divest a person of his property, it still lacked the authority to fix the
value of that property for compensation purposes; that could be determined only by the parties themselves (in this case the owners and
the legislature), or by the parties' commissioners mutually elected, or
by a jury; only thus may compensation be consistent "with the principles and spirit of the constitution and social alliance." How shocking, he exclaimed, that the British, with their limited monarchy,
unwritten constitution, and omnipotent legislature, should seem to
afford greater protection to property rights, in the form of just compensation for land taken for public purposes, than the United States,
a republic with limited legislatures and written constitutions (in which
property is rendered inviolable).7 2 If the parties themselves or their
duly selected commissioners in this particular cause could not settle
on the compensation value of the property the legislature was to take
away, then it must be left to a jury for determination. A jury in such
cases, he noted, stood as a constitutional guard upon property and as
a necessary curb to legislative power; as long as this interposition be69. Id.
70. The idea of a blind law and a completely impartial judicial system, pressing on
all with equal justice, reminds this writer of Anatole Franoe's famous observation: "The
law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."
71. 2 Dallas 312. How far removed temperamentally this view was from Jefferson's statement that he "would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too much liberty
than those attending too small a degree of it"; letter from Jefferson to Archibald Stuart,
December 23, 1791, in LIPSCOMB, JEFFERSON WRINGS, 276.
72. As an illustration Paterson pointed to the Isle of Man, which was a refuge for
smugglers. There the Crown took almost all properties, but not until purchase was freely
made with the owners; 2 Dallas 314.
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tween the legislature and the individual was preserved, private property was secure from violation (except in cases of great public utility
or necessity). 73 Perhaps recalling personal experiences with state legislatures, Paterson continued:
Omnipotence in legislation is despotism. According to this doctrine, we have nothing that we can call our own, or are sure of,
for a moment; we are all tenants at will, and hold our landed
property at the mere pleasure
of the legislature. Wretched situation, precarious tenure.7 4
Having framed the principles concerning the competence of the
courts and the inalienable rights of property, Paterson next proceeded
to the consideration of the specific statute involved in the case. He
held that the Pennsylvania act, which confirmed title on the Connecticut settlers, did not meet the requirements for establishing just
compensation-indeed, it was both unjust and arbitrary-and, therefore, was void. "It never had constitutional existence, it is a dead letter, and of no more virtue or avail, than if it never had been made."7 5
Warmed up to the task of putting legislative power in its place, he
went on:
When the legislature undertake to give away what is not their
own, when they attempt to take the property of one man, which
he fairly acquired, and the general law of the land protects, in
order to transfer it to another, even upon complete indemnification, it will naturally be considered as an extraordinary act of
legislation, which ought to be viewed with jealous eyes, examined
with critical exactness, and scrutinized with all the severity of
legal exposition. An act of this sort deserves no favor; to construe
it liberally would be sinning against the rights of private property.7 6
In addition, the confirming act of Pennsylvania was unconstitutional
as an impairment of the obligation of contract. Over public lands
the legislature had plenary authority, but, Paterson remarked,
...over private property, they have none, except, perhaps, in certain cases, and those under restrictions, and except also, what may
73. Id. at 313, 314, 315.
74. Id., at 316.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 318. This comment by Paterson on the rights of private property is interesting
when compared with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters
243 (1833), that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation restrained the national government and not
the states.
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arise from the enactment and operation of general laws respecting
property, which will affect themselves as well as their constituents.
If the confirming act was a contract between Connecticut settlers and
the legislature of Pennsylvania, it must be regulated by rules and
principles governing all contracts; if this was true, then the act was
clearly invalid,
• .. because it tends .. .to defraud the Pennsylvania claimants,

who are third persons, of their just rights; rights ascertained, protected and secured by the Constitution and known laws of the
land. The plaintiff's title to the land . . .is legally derived from

Pennsylvania; how then, on the principles of contract, could Pennsylvania lawfully dispose of it to another? As a contract, it could
convey no right, without
the owner's consent; without that, it was
fraudulent and void.77
The argument for the decision having been established to his satisfaction, Paterson unequivocally concluded his charge to the jury and
thereby made judicial history. "The confirming act is unconstitutional and void," he declared, "it was invalid, from the beginning,
had no life or operation, and is precisely in the same state, as if it had
not been made."78s
In what is often considered the first clear enunciation of the doctrine
of judicial review of state legislation by a federal court, Paterson was
careful to employ several supports in determining the unconstitutionality of the act: first, and from the standpoint of subsequent constitutional history the most important, he declared that the act violated
the Federal Constitution's prohibition against state legislation impairing the obligation of contracts; second, and at the time probably of
greater weight, he pronounced the law incompatible with the constitution of Pennsylvania, which gave the legislature no unusual powers
over private property and, indeed, guaranteed the protection of property rights; and third, he maintained that the act was invalid as a
violation of the law of nature, which included the inalienable rights
77. 2 Dallas 320. The construction Paterson gave the contract clause of the Constitution has not been unanimously accepted. Benjamin Wright in his work on the contract
clause thinks that the members of the Federal Convention and those who supported its
ratification probably never intended the clause to be so extensive in meaning as to
include within its prohibition provisions a contract to which a state was the party. Most
of the framers, he says, seemingly thought it simply placed a limitation on the states'
monetary powers; THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-

versity Press, 1938), pp. 32-33, 243. Wright's view of the framers' intentions is in marked
contrast to Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810).
78. 2 Dallas 320.
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of man and the motivation for forming the social contract. This
latter rationale implied, of course, that even without specific constitutional provision the natural law, which antedated all societies and
all constitutions (and, indeed, what both were predicated upon) was
judicably enforceable as a restraint on legislative authority; that as
Chancellor Kent later put it: "the right of property is before and
higher than any constitutional sanction. ' 79 Apparently Coke and not
Blackstone was sitting in the courtroom on that day in 1795. However, more was at stake than the rights of property. A decision in
favor of the "squatters," which in effect would have upheld the Pennsylvania confirming act, would not have afforded opportunity for the
judicial promotion of the power and prestige of the federal government (then in the hands of Federalists) and the advancement of the
idea of judicial supremacy over legislative actions.
The Van Home opinion is a revealing study of one man's personal
and political philosophy. Yet, it is more than an insight into the mind
of William Paterson-even more than just a significant part of American constitutional development. It is illuminative of representative
Federalist thought of the period and-when put alongside contemporary liberal (especially Jeffersonian) thought-of how men starting
from similar philosophic foundations reached opposing political conclusions. Paterson thus accepted-as did Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson, and others-the validity of natural law and the "inherent and
unalienable" rights of man; he also shared with most Americans of
the late eighteenth century-conservative and liberal alike-the prevailing ideas on property and property rights and the social-contract
theory of social organization (largely based on Locke); and as a lawyer,
trained in Coke and Blackstone, he acknowledged with other Americans the supremacy of law. From these shared premises Paterson
and the Federalists in general derived not a Jeffersonian confidence
in popular rule but a belief in government by the "better classes,"
a fear of legislative majorities, and an acceptance of the principle of
judicial protection of the Constitution.
Popular with Philadelphia land speculators and most Federalists,
the Paterson decision was printed in pamphlet form and circulated
throughout the country. When, in 1801, Jefferson vigorously opposed
the concept of judicial supremacy, it was once more put forward as
a support for judicial review. Ironically, Van Home's lessee never
79.
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took possession of the land that Paterson's ruling awarded him. Dorrance and his descendants continued to occupy the land. For a while,
however, there was threat of a separatist movement in Pennsylvania
as a result of the decision. In 1799 the Pennsylvania legislature settled the issue finally in a way that Paterson said was a "shame to American legislation." A settlement of the controversy was really brought
about by a collapse in land speculation, which saw Robert Morris in
debtor's prison and Associate Justice James Wilson driven to an ignoble death. 0
CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that, though Paterson and his judicial colleagues were able men, yet in achievement they fell below their Federalist contemporaries who organized the government and set it in
motion during its first decade and a half. Indeed, they even fell below
their own earlier achievement when, as Founding Fathers, they helped
write the Constitution and secure its ratification.
The reason for this "failure" may lie in their political use of the
courts to enhance their own particular view of what the government
of the United States should be. In the Whisky Rebellion trials and
in the Sedition Act trials Paterson and the federal courts permitted
partisan bias to compromise themselves and so to render the federal
judiciary inaccessible, in the eyes of the Republicans, as an instrument
of legal as opposed to political control.
However, in recognizing the weaknesses and failures of the early
Federal judiciary, one need not derogate its impact and its very real
accomplishments. In this sense Marbury was less of a constitutional
revolution than a.more pronounced emphasis of work already begun.
Marshall's victory was not as one critic said, "a victory over Paterson
and Chase as much as over the Republicans." 8 ' Not only were both
Paterson and Chase members of the Marshall Court which promulgated the Marbury decision, but correspondence among the Court's
members reveals that on most important matters the justices were in
essential agreement.
80. J. P. Boyd, William Paterson, Forerunner of John Marshall, in WILLARD THoRp,
THE LIVEs OF EIGHTEEN FROM PRINCETON (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), 17-18.
81. Letter from Marc L. Dembling (editor-in-chief of the RUTGERS LAW REVIEW) to the
author, February 4, 1969).
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The Marshallian statesmanship undoubtedly achieved a prestige
and authority unknown to the earlier judiciary. But it was built on
a foundation-though perhaps a shaky foundation-constructed by
Paterson and his colleagues.
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